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It may be tempting to assume that the conduct of takeover activity in Europe
will automatically follow the pattern that has evolved in the United States where
the ability to manage a campaign against the background of the interplay between
the laws and courts of some fifty states and those of federal application is the clue
to success. There are, however, important differences. There is no common
consensus on the virtues of capitalism or the free market economy. Litigation is
usually seen as a sign of failure rather than a badge of courage. The basic laws
of each country stem from widely divergent political and historical roots, and
despite the increasing presence of English as a second language, the vast bulk of
the population of each of the fifteen countries of Western Europe speak different
languages. England and Ireland, and France and parts of Belgium are the only
ones that share their native tongue with another; the culture, character, and
aspirations of the people of each country are dramatically different, as evidenced
by their history and their literature.
It must be remembered therefore that the European Economic Community
(EEC) is still very much a grouping of countries each with its own idiosyncratic
legal system developed over centuries of history, although now increasingly the
subject of and modified to accord with EEC law. Some harmonization of the laws
of these countries will have taken place as the 1992 program for the single EEC
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TABLE 1
PUBLIC AVAILABILITY OF CORPORATE INFORMATION
Shareholders Corporate Structure Accounts
Belgium No* Yes Yes
France Some** Yes Yes
Germany Some** Yes Yes
Italy Some** Yes Yes
Netherlands No* Yes Yes
Spain No* Yes Yes (Quoted)
United Kingdom Yes Yes Yes
*shares usually in bearer form
**shareholdings over specified thresholds
market is implemented. When it comes to the acquisition of companies based in
them, however, it is unlikely that a "level playing field' between the countries
will be in place by the deadline for the implementation of the single market.
This article reviews acquisitions of "public" or quoted companies in the
major countries of the EEC.2 It examines three areas, detailed knowledge of
which is crucial in planning an acquisition in the EEC: the public availability of
information about the target and its business, the scope for directors, share-
holders, and employees of the target to frustrate or delay the acquirer's
objectives; and the nature of governmental or regulatory controls that may
prevent or affect the course of an acquisition. Relevant EEC controls and the
impact of the 1992 program are then discussed.
It will become clear that the contested takeover bid in its United States or
United Kingdom form is by no means a universal phenomenon in the EEC. In
many jurisdictions, acquisition of an identified target may be possible only with
the agreement of various relevant parties.
I. Public Availability of Information About a Target and Its Business
Accurate and detailed information is essential to the assessment and planning
of an acquisition. The public availability of information as to the identity of the
shareholders of a company, its corporate structure, and finances varies from
country to country. (Table I sets out the situation in each major country.) The
United Kingdom is the only country in which full information as to the identity
of shareholders can be obtained. Limited information as to major shareholders
I. Lord Cockfield, Vice President of the European Commission (with special responsibility for
the Internal Markets). June 9. 1988.
2. Belgiutn. France, West Germany. Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom.
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with holdings over specified thresholds is available in France and Italy. In other
countries, such information is not publicly available at all. This lack of public
information obviously inhibits the hostile bidder in assessing the nature and
distribution of a company's shareholding or in communicating its offer.
Information as to corporate structure is available in all countries. This
information consists in all cases of details of the amount of a company's share
capital, its constitutional documents (stated objects. articles of association,
statutes, or by-laws), and its directors. It may also cover matters such as further
information on share capital, resolutions of the company or its directors, and
charges or restrictions on its property or business.
Company accounts are publicly available in all cases, although only the ac-
counts of quoted companies are available in Spain. Wide differences exist between
countries as to the type, quality, and detail of information contained in company
accounts. The interpretation of these accounts and the assessment of information
revealed would require detailed accounting knowledge in the relevant country. The
EEC has currently adopted two directives3 on accounting matters that, when
implemented by all countries, will raise and harmonize the level of information
publicly available. The issuance of further directives on this topic is anticipated.
II. Scope for Frustrating Action
Readers in the United States will be all too familiar with the range of defensive
measures available to the directors of a company subject to an unwelcome bid
and the resulting antics. That said, the conduct of public offers is highly
regulated in the United States, and the scope for spoiling tactics has clear limits.
The situation in the United Kingdom is further loaded against a beleaguered
board. Once a public offer has been announced, or even when the board of the
target company has reason to believe that a bona fide offer might be imminent,
the board is prohibited under the City Code on Take-overs and Mergers from
taking frustrating action (such as issuing new shares or acquiring or disposing of
material assets) without shareholder approval.
In strong contrast is the position in mainland Europe, where directors,
shareholders, or employees are often in a position to prevent an unwelcome bid.
The reason is largely historical. Until recently contested bids have generally been
rare in continental Europe and as a result the extent of legal or regulatory control
over the way in which bids (and the defense of target companies against
unwelcome bids) are conducted is relatively limited. The scope for defensive
measures is circumscribed in all cases by local company law.
3. Fourth Directive No. 78/660, O.J. EuR. Comm.I. (No. L 222) I1 (1978) (harmonization of
annual accounts of' public limilcd liability companies): Seventh Directive No. 83/349, O.J. EUr.
Comm. (No. L 193) I (1 983) (harmonization of annual accounts of groups of companies).
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As a result, hostile bids in several of the major EEC countries are either
effectively not feasible or accompanied by substantial potential problems.
Careful groundwork is essential, and an agreed deal may be the only available
option.
A. By THE TARGET OR ITS DIRECTORS
The recent bid by Carlo de Benedetti for Socidt6 Generale highlighted the
rudimentary nature of the system for regulating takeovers in Belgium. Although
the Belgian Banking Commission, which is responsible for overseeing public
offers, applies a guiding principle that all shareholders should be treated equally
and given adequate information to make any decisions required of them, there
are few detailed rules governing bids and few specific restrictions on defense
tactics. The board must, however, act in the best interests of its shareholders as
a whole. The scope for frustrating action by the management is accordingly very
wide and would include the issue of new shares to chosen allies of the board in
most situations. Such an issue was made in the Socidtd Generale case.
French companies are more open to hostile bids than their Belgian counter-
parts, as the management of a target has limited scope to adopt defensive
spoiling tactics once a bid has been announced. Prebid defensive moves,
however, are common and legal. These include issuing shares with double voting
rights, issuing convertible securities or options, buying in the company's own
shares, and placing shares in the hands of loyal groups of shareholders that may
be expected to resist an unwelcome bid.
In Germany, contested bids are virtually unheard of. The consequence is only
limited regulation of takeovers, and accordingly, considerable scope for the
management of a target to take defensive action. Such action requires compli-
ance with the numerous relevant provisions of the Stock Corporation Act and the
provisions of the company's articles and by-laws. The issue of new shares and
substantial assets disposals, for instance, will be subject to approval by the
company's supervisory board or shareholders.
The scope in Italy for defensive action is very wide. No statutory provisions
restrict the right of the target company to defend itself from a hostile offer,
although its directors must act in the interests of the company. The Code of
Conduct of the Milan Stock Exchange, which applies to all tender offers made
on the Milan Stock Exchange, however, prohibits a target company from taking
any action during the course of an offer that could substantially alter its assets
and liabilities.
In the Netherlands, the directors of a company must act in the interests of the
enterprise (which is interpreted to include responsibility not just to the share-
holders but also, depending on the circumstances, to the company's employees,
customers, and creditors). Management thus has considerable latitude in em-
ploying defensive measures. Nevertheless, the recent abortive bid by Elsevier
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for Kluwer, during which the Kluwer board employed a wide range of tactics,
including the issue of preferred shares to a board-controlled "foundation," has
stirred considerable discussion as to the desirability of such defensive tactics.
The Stock Exchange Association recently published a report on the use of such
defensive tactics. 4 It concluded that no company should be allowed to implement
more than two defensive measures, and that the implementation of certain
defensive measures should be banned altogether after the announcement of a bid.
The report was not received with enthusiasm by all parties. Representative
organizations of employees, Dutch industry, and many listed companies have
expressed their strong opposition to a dismantling of takeover defenses.
Understandably, organizations representing noninstitutional shareholders are
positive about The Stock Exchange's proposals. It remains to be seen whether
any part of The Stock Exchange Association's proposals will be implemented in
the near future.
Directors of Spanish companies desiring to frustrate a bid are free to take any
desired action within the parameters of general civil, company, and labor laws.
The relatively recent Royal Decree governing public bids 5 does not circumscribe
the range of options open to the directors. (The position in each country is
summarized in the first column of Table 2.)
B. BY THE TARGET'S SHAREHOLDERS
In some European countries, it is common for companies to be immune from
unwanted takeovers due to the composition of their shareholders. In France, for
instance, numerous listed companies have arranged carefully structured "stable
groups" of loyal shareholders. The French Government formed such groups in
connection with the privatization of various state-owned companies, and other
quoted companies have adopted a similar pattern. In Germany, the majority of
businesses are either family-owned or owned by commercial banks that have
large equity stakes and board representation. Hostile bids are, accordingly,
impracticable in these cases, unless the terms are such as to turn the loyalties of
the shareholders in question.
Problems occur in countries, mainly Belgium and the Netherlands, where
bearer shares are common. It is then difficult to assess the composition of a
company's shareholders (essential in evaluating the likelihood of a bid succeed-
ing) and to be sure that details of the bid have been successfully communicated
to shareholders.
Most countries have rules providing for the equal treatment of shareholders
during the course of a bid. There is, however, no requirement for an offer to be
4. Rapport van de Vereniging voor de effectenhandel inzake de toepassing van bescherrning-
sconstructies 4 maart 1988.
5. Royal Decree. January 25, 1984. No. 279/84.
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approved in general meeting. In the case of companies whose securities are listed
on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange or the parallel market, or that are regularly
traded on the over-the-counter market, and that are the subject of public offers by
Dutch or foreign companies, the Dutch Merger Code requires the target's
management to convene a general meeting of shareholders after publication of
the offering memorandum, but no later than eight days before the end of the
period during which shareholders can accept the offer. At least four days prior to
that meeting, the target's management has to make available to shareholders a
report including information on the management's opinion of the proposed offer
and the financial effect on the target. The purpose of the meeting is to enable
shareholders to find out the directors' view of the acquisition, but it remains up
to each shareholder whether or not to accept the offer.
Dissenting minorities can be a thorn in the flesh of a successful bidder. Three
of the jurisdictions under discussion provide a mechanism that enables the bidder
to acquire compulsorily the remaining shares in the target. (These are summa-
rized in the third column of Table 2.) United Kingdom law 6 enables a successful
offerer that has offered to acquire all of a class of shares of a target and has,
within four months of the date of the offer, received valid acceptances from
holders of at least 90 percent in value of the shares in question, to acquire the
outstanding shares in the target on the same terms and conditions as applied to
the bid.
The Netherlands has recently enacted legislation7 that makes it possible for a
shareholder holding 95 percent or more of the issued share capital of the target
in many cases, not just post-bid, to buy out the outstanding minority. The
Amsterdam Court of Appeal must approve these actions and the minority may
oppose them. The consideration payable is determined by independent experts.
The Code of Conduct of the Milan Stock Exchange.8 on the other hand.
actually requires an offerer that has acquired 90 percent of the shares of the target
to acquire the remaining 10 percent on the same terms and conditions as applied
to the last public offer.
C. By THE TARGEr's EM>PLOYEES
Most of the EEC jurisdictions under consideration (apart from Germany and
the United Kingdom) require employees to be notified or consulted in certain
circumstances about a proposed takeover of their company. With the exception
of the Netherlands, however, the employees' right is merely to be consulted: they
have no power to block the takeover or impose conditions. (The fourth column
of Table 2 summarizes the position in each country.) The management of a Dutch
company that has more than 100 employees and a works council has to seek the
6. Companic Act 1985. §§ 428-430.
7. Act n the FBtty-oul of Mi nority Shareholders of Mar. 3. 1988.
8. COoE OFt CoNIl ( o1 1t1i MIL .AN StFocK ExCIIANt ( art. 2. para. 4.
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advice of the works council prior to control of the company being transferred by
agreement. If negative advice is forthcoming, and the management chooses to
ignore that advice, the works council must be informed and the proposed change
of control must be suspended for one month. During this period the works
council has a right of appeal to the court on the ground that, had a reasonable
balancing of interests taken place, the management could not have reached its
decision. The court may issue an order preventing the implementation of the
agreement and in a handful of cases courts have made such orders.
In Germany, employees of codetermined stock corporations may have super-
visory board representation equal to that of equity owners, with a neutral
chairman. Protracted supervisory board meetings may ensue.
It is worth noting that, where the acquisition is of business assets, all the major
EEC countries except Italy have enacted legislation giving effect to an EEC
Council Directive9 and providing that all employees of the business and their
terms and conditions of employment (with some exceptions) automatically
transfer to the purchaser.
III. Governmental and Other Control and Regulation
The only unifying theme that can be extracted from the range of forms of
existing governmental and other control and regulation of takeovers is its
disparity. These forms of control and regulation can be broken down into four
main categories, which are discussed below.
A. COMPETITION AND MONOPOLIES CONTROL
Competition and monopolies regulation vary markedly between the EEC
Member States. These domestic controls (set out in Table 3) need to be complied
with in addition to the relevant provisions of EEC law discussed in section IV.A
below.
At one end of the spectrum, Italy has no such regulation. Spanish law does
permit the government to intervene to control agreements or practices that restrict
free competition within Spain; however, the relevant law' 0 was passed in 1963 in
response to the particular climate prevailing at the time and would not
necessarily be used today. In Belgium, there are laws controlling the abuse of
economic power." These laws are. however, merely concerned with preventing
the abuse of a dominant position to increase prices and are, therefore, primarily
concerned with consumer protection and not aimed specifically at controlling
takeover or merger activity.
9. Council Directive No. 77/187. O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 61) 26 (1977).
10. Law of July 20. 1963 (Repression of Practices Restrictive of Competition).
11. Law of May 27. 1960.
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In the Netherlands, cartels and dominant positions are regulated.' 2 Dominant
positions are not of themselves illegal and there is no requirement to clear in
advance an acquisition that will result in the acquirer having a dominant position.
If, however, such a dominant position would conflict with the general public
interest, the Minister of Economic Affairs can impose certain obligations on the
parties involved, often related to pricing of goods or services. On the other hand,
cartels must be notified to the Minister. If the Minister considers that a cartel is
detrimental to the public interest, the Minister can publish information on it or
even declare the relevant agreement inoperative. Such a declaration, however,
has been made on one occasion only.
In France, an acquisition may be subject to competition regulation' 3 if the
entities concerned either monopolize between them over 25 percent of any
French market or a substantial part of it, or if their turnovers exceed certain
amounts. Acquisitions may be made without the prior approval of the Ministry
of the Economy, but the Ministry may require the parties to take certain action
after the event, ranging from not completing the transaction to modifying its
terms or taking action necessary to establish competition. A clearance procedure
exists, and transactions are deemed cleared in the absence of any objection
within two months of notification to the Ministry (which may extend to six
months if a reference is made by the Ministry to the Competition Council).
The most developed systems of monopoly control are in Germany and the
United Kingdom. Germany has a complex apparatus of notifications and
approvals 14 that may be triggered in a number of ways. A postmerger notification
has to be submitted to the Federal Cartel Office if the acquiring company or the
target company has a market share in any German market of at least 20 percent,
or if the companies have an aggregate worldwide turnover in excess of a specified
amount or a worldwide workforce of 10,000 or more employees. Pre-merger
notification and approval are needed in all cases where certain turnover limits are
exceeded.
In the United Kingdom, 15 in order for the relevant authority, the Monopolies
and Mergers Commission (MMC), to investigate corporate acquisitions, either
the gross value of the worldwide assets taken over must exceed £30 million or,
as a result of the merger, the enterprises that thereafter cease to be distinct (which
includes share acquisitions) would together supply or consume at least 25 percent
of any goods or services of the same description supplied in the United Kingdom
or a substantial part of it. Relevant transactions are referred to the MMC by the
relevant Government Minister after a report by the Office of Fair Trading (OFF).
Recently references have been made (notably of the Kuwait Investment Office
12. Act on Economic Competition of 1958.
13. Ordinance No. 86-1243. Dec. I. 1986, arts. 38 et seq.
14. Act Against Restraints of Competition. Sept. 24. 1980.
15. Fair Trading Act of 1973.
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holding in British Petroleum) for "public interest" rather than pure competition
reasons.
There is no requirement for prior notification to the OFT of a proposed
acquisition, although it is possible to seek confidential guidance from the
Director-General of the OFT as to whether the proposed transaction would likely
be referred to the MMC. To obtain such guidance, which can be heavily
qualified, usually takes two or three weeks.
If a transaction is referred to the MMC, either as a result of a prior approach
or after the deal becomes public, the MMC makes an investigation as to whether
it is contrary to the public interest. If the MMC finds the transaction contrary to
the public interest, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry has power to
make orders, including orders for the sale of shares or assets, so as to remedy the
effects that the MMC concluded were contrary to the public interest.
B. FOREIGN INvEsTMENTr/ExcI-ANGL CONTROL
A number of European countries control foreign investment. As with
competition law, a great disparity exists between countries as to the scope and
extent of such controls. (These controls are summarized, together with relevant
exchange controls, in Table 3.)
In Spain, prior clearance based on detailed information to be submitted in
advance is required for an acquisition of a 50 percent or more stake in a Spanish
company. 16 An acquisition is deemed cleared unless a notification is received
from the relevant authority within thirty days of the submission.
In France the purchase by a non-EEC investor of more than 20 percent of the
shares in a French company requires a prior declaration to, or the prior
authorization of, the "Direction du Tr6sor," depending on whether the invest-
ment is over ten million francs and also whether the target is already under
foreign control. 7 If the investor is under the control of an EEC resident or
Member State, a prior declaration to the Direction du Trdsor is required in the
case of the purchase of more than 20 percent of the shares in a French company.
The transaction is deemed cleared after the expiration of a specified waiting
period.
Belgium imposes no restrictions on foreign investments generally; however,
any public offer for a company's listed shares made by a non-EEC offerer needs
prior approval of the Ministry of Finance.' 8 This requirement can be avoided if
the offer is made through an EEC-based company.
It is often forgotten that in the United Kingdom wide discretionary govern-
mental powers exist under the Industry Act 1975 for the control of "transfers of
16. Royal Legislative Decree. June 27. 1986, No. 1265/1986 (Foreign Investment in Spain),
17. Decree No. 67-78. Jan. 27, 1987. and Circular of May 21. 1967. as amended by Circular of
Sept. 24, 1988.
18. Law of July II. 1972.
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control of important manufacturing undertakings to non-residents." "Impor-
tant" means any undertaking that appears to the Secretary of State to be of
special importance to the United Kingdom or any substantial part of it. This
power has never been used, but one can speculate that a full bid by the Kuwaiti
Government for British Petroleum would have sent civil servants scurrying for
this Act.
Linked to foreign investment control is exchange control. Although generally
diminishing in importance, it is still necessary to ascertain the position in the
country of acquisition. In Italy, for instance, a foreigner can freely acquire shares
in a local company, provided certain requirements are satisfied. 19 In Spain, any
movement of funds between residents and nonresidents must be made through a
Spanish bank, which is required to report the transaction to the Bank of Spain.
C. CONTROL OF SENSITIVE INDUSTRIES
In addition to the control of foreign investments per se, the governments of the
EEC countries exercise control over the conduct of certain industries regarded as
sensitive (which often include banking, insurance, newspaper publishing,
broadcasting, and air transport), and the acquisition of companies or businesses
engaged in them, irrespective of the nationality of the relevant parties. In most
cases, the government in question has the right to block or impose conditions on
an acquisition, regardless of whether the acquirer is foreign.
The form and extent of the relevant controls in each country are too detailed
and varied to be examined at length in this article. (The relevant industries are
identified in Table 3.)
D. REGULATION OF TAKEOVER ACTIVITY
Contested takeover bids have historically been relatively unusual in Europe,
with the exception of the United Kingdom. In the United Kingdom, takeover
bids have formed a significant part of securities activity. As a result, the extent
of control over takeover activity is generally limited in comparison to the
position in the United States or the United Kingdom and, once again, the national
systems of regulation are widely disparate. The system in the United Kingdom,
as Europe's most developed, is discussed in detail below and comparison is then
made with the systems in the other EEC countries. (Various features often
considered to be key are summarized in relation to each country in Table 4.)
19. These requirements relate primarily to the transfer of the necessary funds through an
appropriately authorized bank and to the terms of the transaction. In the case of a quoted company.
the bank in charge of the transaction will require an independent valuation when the price offered by
the fbreign offerer is different from the price quoted on the stock exchange. In the case of an
unquoted company. an independent valuation will be required in any event.
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Proposals are under discussion for a new EEC Directive20 to harmonize and
regulate takeover bid procedure. These proposals are in their infancy, but it is
clear that, once such a Directive has been implemented, the situation will alter
radically. Accordingly, the wide variations between the countries as to the style
and level of controls will be reduced.
1. In the United Kingdom
The City Code on Take-overs and Mergers (the Code), which is supervised by
the Panel on Take-overs and Mergers (the Panel), was established in 1968. The
fundamental principle underlying all the rules of the Code is to ensure that all
shareholders affected by a takeover bid or merger proposal are treated fairly. The
Code enunciates general principles of conduct to be observed and lays down
rules based on those principles. An executive appointed by the Panel is available
for consultation at any stage before a formal offer document is dispatched as well
as during the course of any transaction. The most important feature of the Code
is that it constitutes self-regulation by the securities industry and there is no direct
legislation in support. It is intended to be a code of good business practice for the
protection of shareholders.
Although breach of the Code carries no specified legal sanction, the joint
cooperation of the institutions that, by their acceptance and support, give
authority to the Code and the support that the Panel receives from the Bank of
England and the Department of Trade and Industry, provide together an effective
range of sanctions. The sanctions available to the Panel, although most of them
are operated "in terrorem," are recourse to private or public censure; 2 1 the
ability to ensure that financial advisers are deprived temporarily or permanently
of their ability to practice in the field of takeovers and mergers; 22 the ability to
request the Council of The Stock Exchange to suspend the listing of any security
in order to prevent dealings taking place; 23 the ability to prevent a listing being
granted for new securities to be issued in connection with an acquisition when a
breach of the Code has occurred;2 4 and reference of the facts of any case to the
Department of Trade and Industry, 25 which is likely to be influenced in
exercising any discretions it may have (for instance, as to the making of a
statutory investigation of a Company's affairs).
The perceived advantages of the nonstatutory basis of the Code and the Panel
are that it constitutes regulation by professionals who have considerable direct
20. This will be the 13th Company Law Directive. For detailed discussion, see infra notes 81-82
and accompanying text.
21. Tin: CIrY CoDE ON TAK:t-ovFRs AND MERGIRS 1968. Introduction, para. 3(d) revised on Apr.
19. 1985 (consisting of' ten principles and thirty-seven rules) [hereinafter Tim CIY CoD).
22. Id. para. l(c).
23. Id.
24. E.g.. by reporting the relevant facts to The Stock Exchange.
25. Ti Crr CoDL. supro note 20, Introduction, para. 3(d).
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experience in their field, and that it is a flexible and informal means of controlling
what are usually rapidly moving transactions. Were it more legalistic, and there-
fore, encumbered with stricter procedural rules and greater bureaucratic controls,
the effective regulation of these transactions would be impaired. Opponents of
self-regulation by the securities industry claim that the system is too cozy, that it
lacks teeth, and that effective regulation of such a complex area needs to be legally
based and governmentally administered. The Code and the Panel came under
heavy attack in the wake of the Guinness scandal; they remain, as yet, intact.
Any ruling by the Panel, which comprises a representative from most of its
sponsoring bodies, is subject to appeal. Such an appeal may be made to an
Appeal Committee chaired by a former judge. The Panel will postpone any
public reprimand or censure until the Appeal Committee has heard the appeal. 26
No appeal, however, will lie to this Committee on a finding of fact by the Panel.
In a recent case 27 the courts were asked to rule whether the decisions of the Panel
were subject to judicial review and to overturn a particular decision. The Court
of Appeal decided, against the vigorous pleading of the Panel, that as a semipublic
body the Panel's ruling should not be exempt from judicial review, but that in
normal circumstances the court would not overturn its decisions, preferring only
to lay down guidelines for the future. It remains to be seen whether the court, the
next time it has to consider the matter, will become more interventionist.
A separate set of nonstatutory rules, the "Substantial Acquisition Rules"
(SARs), which are administered by the Panel in common with the Code, regulate
purchases of blocks of shares otherwise than in takeover situations. Typically the
SARs apply where a potential bidder is attempting to build up a stake prior to
making a bid.
a. General Principles of the Code
Two main interrelated threads run through the provisions of the Code:
S First, the shareholders of an offeree company are to decide whether or not
an offer should succeed, and to this end the Code requires the provision of
adequate information and time. It requires the offerer company to acquire
voting control of a company before it can declare its offer unconditional. 28
It prohibits actions designed to frustrate a bid being undertaken without the
approval of the shareholders of the offeree company. 2 ) It has stringent
requirements for the disclosure of share dealing during an offer, 30 and it
requires information disclosed to one prospective offerer to be disclosed to
all other prospective offerers.
3
'
26. Id. para. 3(f).
27. R. v. the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers. Ex Parte Datafin PLC. 2 W.L.R. 699 (U.K. 1987).
28. TmI- CIT CODE. supra note 20, R. 10.
29. Id. R. 21.
30. Id. R. 8.
31. Id. R. 19.4.
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0 Second, the various investors in the offeree company must receive equitable
treatment. To this end, the rules require that the highest price paid over a
reasonable period of time preceding. the offer must be given to all
shareholders to whom the offer is made. 32 Insider trading is prohibited, 33
and partial bids 34 and the sale of controlling blocks of shares in companies
are carefully regulated. 35 The rules require the Board of an offeree company
to seek independent outside financial advice. 36 The Code requires that,
where an offer is made for equity share capital, appropriate arrangements
must be made for the holders of any convertible securities, warrants,
options, or subscription rights outstanding in the offeree company. 37 The
Code provides that no special deals with favorable conditions may be
entered into unless available to all shareholders.
38
b. Change of Control-Requirement for a Bid
The Code operates from the premise that, where there is a change of control
of a public company, the new controllers should offer all shareholders the
opportunity to dispose of their shares at the same price at which the controllers
acquired their controlling interest. Accordingly, all shareholders, large and small
alike, are given the opportunity to realize their holdings.
The Code determines that control is deemed to mean a holding, or aggregate
holdings, of shares carrying 30 percent or more of the voting rights of the
company irrespective of whether that holding or holdings gives de facto control.
In order to identify a controlling holding of shares, the Code looks beyond legal
or beneficial ownership to whether any group of persons "acting in concert"
may have acquired or be exercising control.
i. The Mandatory Bid. The Code requires that, unless the Panel otherwise
agrees, any person or "concert party" that acquires 30 percent or more of the
voting rights of a company must offer to acquire all the outstanding equity shares
of the target at the highest price paid by that person or concert party within the
twelve months preceding the acquisition that triggered the requirement to make
an offer. 41 Furthermore, if any person. together with others acting in concert
with that person. holds 30 percent or more (but not more than 50 percent) of the
voting shares of a company. and such person acquires more than 2 percent of the
voting rights of that company in any twelve-month period, then again that person
32. Id. R. 9.5: R. I.I.
33. hi. R. 4.1. Company Securities (Insider Dealings) Act 1985.
34. Tiii C-r Cow:. supra note 20. R. 36.
35. Id. R. 5.
36. i. R. 3.
37. Id. R. 15.
38. Id. R. 16.
39. Id. Detinitions section.
40. It. R. 9.
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is required to extend an offer to all outstanding shareholders at the highest price
that such person has paid in the preceding twelve months.4
The Code further safeguards the interests of the outside shareholders in
instances such as when an offerer might put itself in the position where it was
obligated to make an offer but was in fact unable to fulfill its obligations because,
for example, it did not have the necessary funds. The Code requires that when an
announcement of an offer is made, the financial adviser to the offerer or some
other appropriate independent party must confirm, in the press announcement of
the offer, that resources are available to the offerer to enable it to satisfy full
acceptance of the offer. If the offerer itself is then unable to comply with its
obligations, the Panel could call upon the financial adviser to do so.
42
ii. Cash Alternative. The Code has provisions to prevent an offerer
company from acquiring a significant holding of shares in a potential offeree
company, say 29 percent, for cash, and then offering to acquire the outstanding
shares by means of a share-for-share offer or by means of an offer involving
some other security of the offerer. Where an offerer, and any person acting in
concert with it prior to the closing of the offer and within twelve months prior to
the announcement of the offer, has acquired for cash 15 percent or more of the
voting rights of the class of shares in the offeree in question, then the offerer
must accompany the offer with a cash alternative at not less than the highest price
that it has paid for shares in the twelve-month period.43 If the Panel believes that
other circumstances render it necessary to require a cash alternative in order to
give effect to General Principle i, then it may require the offerer to make a cash
alternative in any event.
44
iii. Partial Bids. An offer must usually be conditional upon the offerer's
resulting holding in the company carrying over 50 percent of the voting rights.
Partial bids are allowed only in rare circumstances, upon compliance by the
offerer with various strict requirements of the Code.
45
c. Disclosure of Information
The status of the announcement of a firm intention to make an offer is very
important in terms of the Code. The Code provides that no announcement may
be made unless the offerer has every reason to believe that it can and will
continue to be able to implement the offer, and responsibility for ensuring that
this is the case rests on the financial adviser to the offerer.46 Once a firm
announcement has been issued, the offerer must proceed with the offer except
with the consent of the Panel; a simple change in general, economic, industrial,
41. Id.
42. Id. R. 2.5(c).
43. Id. R. 11.1(a).
44. Id. R. 11.1(b).
45. Id. R. 36.
46. Id. R. 2.5(a).
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or political circumstances will not justify failure to proceed with an announced
offer.47 Announcements are positively required in a range of circumstances,
primarily to ensure that information is made public when public interest requires
that it should be.
The Code also provides that shareholders must be given sufficient information
and advice to enable them to reach a properly informed judgment as to the merits
or demerits of an offer.48 The obligation of the offerer in these respects towards
the shareholders of the offeree company is not less than the offerer's obligation
towards its own shareholders. Accordingly, the Code and Stock Exchange Rules
require a wide range of specified information to be set out in a formal offer
document and in circulars by the target.
d. Restrictions on Dealings
Acquisitions of blocks of shares, prior to a bid, are governed in the United
Kingdom by the Substantial Acquisition Rules, which were introduced in the
light of the disquiet caused by "dawn raids" where blocks of shares representing
up to 30 percent of companies were acquired in the market in a matter of
minutes. Broadly, a purchaser may not increase its holding to over 15 percent but
less than 30 percent (at which point the provisions of the Code become
applicable) by market purchases of 10 percent or more in any period of seven
days. but must proceed by way of a tender offer available to all shareholders. The
object of these rules is to ensure that effective control of a company does not pass
without the board having the opportunity to advise shareholders and to give all
shareholders an equal chance to sell shares.
Once a company has determined that it will make an offer, it is free, in contrast
to the position in the United States. to purchase shares and continue to make
purchases in general throughout the offer period albeit that it may have to disclose
these purchases. This freedom, however, is limited in two particular respects.
First, unless the board of the target recommends the bid or the purchases are
made from a single shareholder, a bidder is not entitled to purchase shares that
when aggregated with its existing holding will take it beyond 30 percent during
the first twenty-one days of its offer.49 The object of this rule is to ensure that if
there is another offer or the board wishes to resist the offer and explain why, it
has time to explain its reasons to shareholders before the transaction becomes a
fait accompli. The second restriction is that the cash price paid by an offerer must
be offered to all other shareholders if a purchase is made prior to the offer in
certain circumstances.
47. Id. R. 2.7.
48. Id. R. 23.2.
49. d. R. 5.
50. Id. R. 6.1.
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e. Disclosure of Dealings
By the Companies Act 198551 any acquirer of more than 5 percent of the
issued equity capital of a public company must declare its interest within five
days, and complex rules exist whereby interests of interconnected parties are
aggregated. In addition, companies are given the power to investigate the
beneficial ownership of shares, and insofar as any nominee refuses to answer as
to the beneficial owner it represents, then the company is entitled to disenfran-
chise those shares.5 2 This power is increasingly being used and thus makes it
much more difficult for a bidder to build up an interest in a company secretly
even below the 5 percent threshold.
The means adopted for ensuring that no improper dealings occur during an
offer is a regulation requiring disclosure of holdings and dealings in the offer
document or by announcement. The offer document must disclose the share-
holdings in the target of a wide range of specified people and bodies and relevant
dealings in the last twelve months. 53 If the offerer is offering its own equity
securities as consideration or part of the consideration, then the offer document
must also give details of various specified shareholdings and dealings in such
securities. 54 Details of various specified shareholdings in the target and the
offerer must also be given in the document circulated by the directors of the
target.55 The directors must state if they intend to accept the offer in respect of
their own shareholdings.
Once the offer has been announced, any dealings by the parties to the offer,
including concert parties and "associates" (which is widely defined and includes
the relevant company's pension fund), in either the offerer or offeree company's
shares must be disclosed daily by way of announcement to The Stock Exchange,
the Panel, and the press. 56 Any such announcement of dealings must contain
details of any arrangement in relation to the securities in question that exists for
the offerer, or any person acting in concert with it, or for the offeree company,
to bear any associated liability (e.g., indemnity or option arrangements).
A recently introduced rule also requires disclosure of dealings whereby the
holder has or will have more than I percent of the share capital of either party.
This rule is designed to ensure that market support operations are known to the
market at an early stage-a sensitive issue in the light of the Guinness scandal.
f. Timings
Once the terms of an offer have been announced, the offer document should
normally be posted within twenty-eight days of the announcement of the terms
51. Companies Act 1985, § 198-204.
52. Id. § 212.
53. Tint Crry CoDE. sutpra note 20, R. 24.3.
54. Id.
55. Id. R. 25.3.
56. Id. R. 8.
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of the offer,5 7 and at the same time, or as soon as possible thereafter, the board
of the target should circulate its view on the offer.
58
An offer must remain open for at least twenty-one days but may not remain
conditional for more than sixty days. 59 Except when there are competitive bids,
the Code attempts to limit the period during which the company is under siege
to sixty days from the date of posting of the document, and a number of rules
effectively lay down a timetable to ensure this is achieved. 60 Furthermore, if an
offer has not been declared unconditional as regards the level of acceptances
within twenty-one days from the first closing date (i.e., forty-two days into the
offer period), an accepting shareholder has the right to withdraw its acceptance. 6'
Any revised offer must be kept open for at least fourteen days from the date of
posting the revised offer document.62
g. Provision of Information to Other Bidders
It may be a surprise to overseas investors that the Code mandates that if
information is provided to one bidder, equal information has to be provided to
any other bona fide bidder, however unwelcome. 63 The result of this rule is that
boards of companies are very reluctant to provide detailed information to a
bidder. however friendly, unless they are certain that its bid will succeed. The
ability of even a friendly bidder to carry out due diligence will often, therefore,
be extremely limited. This inability often deters bidders from proceeding.
2. Continental Europe
a. Systems of Regulation
The systems of regulation of takeover bids in the major countries of
continental Europe are diverse both as to their method and their extent. Two are
statutory, two semistatutory, and two voluntary. Germany, the least regulated
country, has no regulatory authority responsible for takeovers. The only rules
governing public offers are voluntary guidelines 64 promulgated in 1979 by the
Stock Exchange Committee of Experts, which is affiliated with the Federal
Minister of Finance. There is, therefore, no system for policing and enforcing the
guidelines, accordingly, the conduct of a bid is virtually untrammelled.
Similar problems exist in respect to the other nonstatutory jurisdiction, the
Netherlands, which has a merger code supervised by the Merger Committee
57. Id. R. 30.1.
58. Id. R. 30.2.
59. Id. R. 31.1: R. 31.6.
60. Id. R. 31.
61. Id. R. 34.
62. Id. R. 32.1.
63. Id. R. 19.4.
64. Guidelines for public. voluntary purchase and conversion offers and/or invitations to make
such offers for officially listed shares or transfer rights or for those sold on the regulated unofficial
market. INITERNATIONAL SEcuRrrls tLAW AND PRACTICE 119 (J. M. Robinson ed. 1985).
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instituted by the Social and Economic Council (an advisory body to the govern-
ment). The rules of the Merger Code do not have the force of law and are backed
by twofold sanctions: public statements by the Merger Committee concerning
nonobservance of the Merger Code; or public statements of censure.65 In addition,
injunctions and damages may be available, although no such claim has yet been
instituted. The member of the Netherlands Stock Exchange Association through
which the bid is made has the duty to procure observance of the Merger Code. 66
This array of sanctions is relatively toothless and would not operate to restrict
undesirable activities by unscrupulous parties to a bid.
In France, regulation of takeovers is entrusted to bodies of both statutory and
nonstatutory nature.67 These bodies have approval powers and control over the
terms of a bid and over the necessary documentation, and accordingly can
prevent the making of a bid at all. These powers ensure the enforceability of
requirements both as to the terms of an offer and their fairness, and the
appropriate level and form of information to be disseminated.
Takeovers in Italy are not specifically dealt with by an Italian law or
regulation. They are, however, usually deemed to be "solicitations of savings"
and accordingly subject to the control of the Commission for Companies and
Stock Exchange (CONSOB). The nature and extent of this control is. however,
unclear and currently a subject of debate. Its powers extend more to the
dissemination of appropriate information than to the merits of a transaction; in
particular, the necessary prospectus must receive CONSOB approval before
issue. 68 The Milan Stock Exchange Code of Conduct contains rules as to the
conduct of bids, but has no binding force. The sanctions for breach are public
announcements as to the violation and requirements as to whether the offer
proceeds, backed up by fines and criminal sanctions.
In Belgium, supervision of takeovers is the responsibility of a statutory body,
the Banking Commission, which is charged with overseeing public offers. 6 9 In
theory, the powers of the Banking Commission are very limited. It cannot
65. Merger Code, ch. IV, art. 32.
66. AMSTEROAM STOCK EXCHANGE Assoc. CIRCULAR No. 339 (July 17. 1970).
67. E.g.. the Stock Exchanges Council (Conseil des Bourses de Valeurs), an independent
professional body which controls dealings on The Stock Exchange and is responsible for the analysis
and approval of the price of a cash offer and the terms and conditions of a share exchange offer
(which has delegated some of its power to the company of the French Stock Exchange (Societd des
Bourses Franqaises): the Stock Exchange Commission (Commission des Op6rations de Bourse or
"C.O.B."), an independent administrative authority which is responsible for the proper disclosure of
information and the approval of relevant "prospectuses" and the Ministry of the Economy, Finance
and Budget, which coordinates the creation of regulations applicable to takeovers. Representatives of
the above authorities meet within the framework of the Supervisory Board of Takeovers (Comit6 de
Surveillances des Offices Publiques) which harmonizes the activities of the Stock Exchange
authorities which are involved in takeover procedures.
68. Law No. 216 of June 7, 1974, art. 18. Official Gazette, June 8, 1974. No. 149, as amended
b%- Law No. 77 of Mar. 23. 1983. Official Gazette. Mar. 28, 1983, No. 83.
69. Royal Decree No. 185 of July 9, 1935. Moniteur Beige (July 10. 1935).
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prohibit an offer, restrict its terms, or impose legal requirements as to how it is
made. It can only veto the making of an offer for a period of up to three months
and make public its decision. Its informal persuasive powers are, by virtue of its
broad powers of supervision over Belgian banks, considerably wider than its
formal mandate, but by no means sufficient to enforce the orderly conduct of
takeover activity, as the recent Soci6t6 Generale bid demonstrated.
The Syndic Councils of Spain's four official Stock Exchanges are empowered
by law to control takeover activity. 70 They exert control over wide areas of
procedure, practice, documentation, and disclosure. The terms of the offer and
the formal offer document both need the approval of the relevant Syndic Council,
without which the bid cannot proceed. 7' Syndic Councils can, and do, reject the
terms of a bid, although such a rejection must be reasoned and is subject to
appeal.72 It is likely that the extent of regulatory control of the terms of an offer,
other than to ensure dual treatment of shareholders and procedural fairness, will
be reduced in the future as EEC harmonization progresses. The powers of veto
of the Syndic Councils are currently wider than in other EEC member countries.
Clearly, the regulatory systems of these countries have little in common as to
their structure and application. They have been shaped by the environment in
which they have evolved. Some of the systems are statutory, some voluntary, and
some hybrid. Their effectiveness and the strength of available sanctions seem to
have little relationship to their origins.
b. Underlying Principles
Although it is difficult to extract distinctive common themes from the different
systems, they all have investor protection as an underlying principle. Its
manifestation varies from country to country. In Belgium, for instance, the
Banking Commission seeks to ensure the equal treatment of, and the adequacy
of information supplied to, the target's shareholders. 73 The German voluntary
guidelines seek to prevent preferences of some shareholders over others. 74 In
Italy, CONSOB's duties are to ensure that sufficient and not misleading
information is made available by the offerer to the public. 75 The Milan Stock
Exchange's Code of Conduct seeks to ensure that the terms of the offer are fair
and that there is no discrimination between shareholders. 76
The aims of the different systems are not limited to protection of the
shareholders of the target. In Belgium, the Banking Commission is concerned
70. Royal Decree No. 279/84 of Jan. 25. 1984, Official Bulletin 16 (Feb. 16, 1984).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Law of June 10. 1964, Moniteur Beige (June 20. 1964): Royal Decree No. 185 of July 9,
1935, supra note 69.
74. General Principle I of the voluntary guidelines. supra note 63 and accompanying text.
75. Law No. 216 of June 7. 1974. arts. 3, 4.5 and 18, Official Gazette, June 8, 1974, No. 149,
as amended b' Law No. 77 of Mar. 23. 1983. Official Gazette. Mar. 28. 1983, No. 83.
76. MILAN STOCK ExciuANG COoE Ot CONoucT art. 3, REVISTA DELLA SOCIETA 1169 (1971).
VOL. 23. NO. 2
ACQUISITIONS OF COMPANIES IN EUROPE 395
with maintaining an orderly market. 7 In the Netherlands, a whole chapter of the
Merger Code deals with the protection of employees' rights in a merger.78
c. Detailed Provisions
All the regulatory systems provide for regulation of the terms and conduct of
the offer. As mentioned above, the extent to which the terms can actually be
controlled by the relevant body vary from country to country. All systems deal
with issues such as price and the form of consideration offered, timing, and to
whom the offer must be made. How the relevant rules are expressed, and the
extent of regulation they impose, are entirely idiosyncratic to each country. A
wide range of other matters are also requirements of or controlled by some or all
of the countries. The extent to which the different countries regulate or constrict
the ability of the target's board to frustrate an unwanted bid varies widely.
All the systems aim to ensure that adequate information is disseminated to the
appropriate parties. They require a formal offer document to be published, with
various fairly standard basic contents, although no two countries have the same
detailed requirements. Requirements as to the publication and circulation of the
offer document vary both as to whether mailing to individual shareholders is
required and as to the extent of other publicity such as advertisements or official
filings.
Rules as to dealings in shares of the offerer or target also vary. Unlike in the
United States, acquisitions during the offer period are not generally prevented.
Nevertheless, such acquisitions, as well as holdings at various specified levels,
are in some cases disclosable in the offer document or to the relevant authorities.
d. Comparison with the United Kingdom
Profound differences exist between all the major EEC countries as to the style,
scope, and effectiveness of their regulation of takeover activity. That none
provides the same depth and effectiveness of regulation as the system in the
United Kingdom is generally accepted. The Panel is a watchdog with real teeth,
run by professionals with detailed relevant experience who are in a position to
respond promptly and effectively to changing situations. In most other European
countries, the regulation of takeover activity is backed by inadequate sanctions
and administered by bodies inappropriately equipped for their task. The City
Code is more detailed and sophisticated than any of its equivalents and provides
an environment in which the interests of the offerer, the management of the
target, and most important of all, the shareholders of the target are carefully
balanced. The City Code has formed the basis of the codes of conduct of bids in
various countries, and in particular France and Italy. In France, the methods of
the SEC have also been influential.
77. Supra note II.
78. Merger Code. ch. I. SER-besluit Fusiegedragsregels (1975).
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IV. EEC Control of Acquisitions
A. MERGER CONTROLS
I. Current Controls
The European Commission's powers to evaluate mergers pursuant to articles
85 and 86 of the 1957 Treaty of Rome currently exist alongside national ones.
The scope of these powers is uncertain. The decision of the European Court of
Justice (ECJ) in the recent Philip Morris/Rothmans case79 has potentially greatly
widened the scope for control of acquisitions by the Commission, although the
nature of this extended scope is far from clear. The ECJ decided in this case that
article 85 of the Treaty of Rome, which prohibits "agreements which . . . are
able to affect trade between Member States and which . . . restrict competition
within the Common Market," can apply to certain types of share acquisition.
This decision reverses the position as previously understood, which was that
article 85 had no such application.
The Philip Morris case shows that the ECJ is now prepared to apply article 85
where company A acquires a minority stake in company B (the two remaining
distinct entities) and the holding is used as a means of coordinating behavior
between the two companies or where company A acquires an interest in company
B, the controlling shareholder of company B being a competitor of company A
or carrying on business in a related field to that in which company A carries on
business. While the judgment clearly extends the scope of article 85, it does not,
on its face, extend the application of article 85 to outright acquisitions or indeed
to the acquisition of a controlling interest.
Acquisitions of control may, however, be caught by article 86 of the Treaty of
Rome, which prohibits the abuse of a dominant position in the EEC or a
substantial part of the EEC. The ECJ's interpretation of article 86 in the
Continental Can case 8° demonstrates that the mere acquisition of the company by
a competitor could of itself constitute an abuse of a dominant position. The
practical difficulties faced by the Commission in applying article 86 to merger
control are evident from the fact that the Continental Can case remains its only
formal merger decision to date. Nevertheless, the Commission's powers under
article 86 have had a critical influence on a number of mergers, not least the
British Airways/British Caledonian merger, where British Airways was obliged
to give certain additional undertakings to the Commission as to the future
conduct of the business of the merged entity, after the merger had already been
cleared by the United Kingdom Monopolies and Mergers Commission.
The recent consortium bid for Irish Distillers Group was halted when the
Commission objected to it on the grounds that it would constitute an abuse of a
79. British Am. Tobacco Co. v. E.C. Comm. (Philip Morris Inc. and Rembrand Group Ltd.
intervening) (Cases 142/84 G 156/84) 119881 4 COMM. MKT. L.R. 24.
80. EuropembalIage v. Comm. 1973 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 215, 12 COMM. MKT. L.R. 199.
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dominant position by ihe consortium. This controversial use of articie 86 clearly
demonstrates the willingness of the Commission to go beyond the previously
generally accepted ambit of article 86.
Articles 85 and 86 present practical problems in that neither article provides
for prior notification of a proposed acquisition or merger, or for a formal grant
of approval. In practice, parties may discuss a proposed transaction and sound
out the Commission's likely reaction to a share acquisition or merger and discuss
changes that might render it acceptable to the Commission. Even then, persons
with a "legitimate interest" (which could include an unwilling target or a
third-party competitor) may make a complaint to the Commission. If the
Commission decides that an acquisition or merger does infringe article 85 or
article 86, it has the power to impose a substantial fine (up to 10 percent of
turnover) or, in an extreme case, to order divestment.
2. Proposals for Reform
The European Commission has for many years sought to institute a more
formal system of Community-wide merger control. Indeed, a draft regulation
was first proposed as far back as 1973. Certain Member States have, however,
been reluctant to cede control in this area. Little progress was made until recently
when the Commission of the EEC, led by Mr. Peter Sutherland, the Commis-
sioner responsible for competition, threatened to make extensive future use of its
perceived powers under articles 85 and 86. The Irish Distillers case is an
example of this new attitude. The Commission is now proposing formalized
regulations governing "concentrations," in parallel with the 1992 program, with
a greater jikelihood of success. It is thought that the regulations would, in their
current form, catch approximately 150 transactions each year.
Under the current dcaft of the proposed Merger Regulation,"' a "concentra-
tion" exists where a merger or acquisition of control takes place. The Merger
Regulation will only apply to a concentration having a "Community dimen-
sion." This definition is complex; whether or not a concentration has a
"Community dimension" will turn on the countries in which the relevant
enterprises carry on their activities and the size of their aggregate turnover.
Concentrations with a "Community dimension" will be prohibited if they are
not compatible with the Common Market: where they give rise to or strengthen
a dominant position in the Common Market or in a substantial part of it.
Concentrations are presumed to be compatible with the Common Market where
the market share of the undertakings concerned in the Common Market, or a
substantial part of it, is less than 25 percent.
The draft Merger Regulation requires that a concentration with a "Community
dimension" must be notified in advance. A concentration cannot be put into
81. COM (88) 734. O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 22) 14 (1989).
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effect until the Commission informs the parties that there are no grounds for
action under the Merger Regulation, or two months elapse without the Commis-
sion initiating proceedings under the Merger. Regulation. The Commission may
make one of several decisions, which are either that the concentration does not
give rise to any substantial change in the competitive structure within the
Community, or that the concentration gives rise to or strengthens a dominant
position in the Common Market (or in a substantial part of it) and either is, or is
not, eligible for authorization.
If this regulation is adopted, it will be important to consider any sizeable
proposed European acquisition in the light of it. Bear in mind, however, that
local competition and merger laws will continue in force even after any new
Merger Regulation is adopted. The future interrelationship of national and EEC
rules is at the moment entirely unclear, as the draft Merger Regulation contains
no provisions relevant to this issue.
B. REGULATION OF TAKEOVER ACTivITY
A European Commission working group of experts has been considering a
proposal for a draft Directive82 on takeovers. Although the detailed provisions
are at an early stage, it is clear that the Directive, when adopted, will have
profound implications on the conduct of takeovers in the EEC. First, it is likely
to provide for the establishment in each country of a statutory body with the task
of overseeing all takeover activity. This move would be very beneficial in
countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, or Belgium, where a lack of strong
control has contributed to the creation of environments in which the portfolio
investor is liable to miss the opportunity to reap the full benefits of its
investment. An official statutory body backed by statutory sanctions would be
expected to be in a better position to impose effective controls. In countries
where regulation is more sophisticated, such a move is viewed with suspicion. In
the United Kingdom, in particular, it is seen as having "major implications for
the Panel's non-statutory system for regulating takeovers. ' 83 A statutory system
would be expected to increase bureaucracy and decrease the flexibility that is a
feature, and perceived as one of the great benefits, of the self-regulatory system
currently overseen by the Panel.
The new Directive would impose requirements as to the conduct of takeover
activity. These would be likely to include: notification and publicity requirements
at the outset of the bid: restrictions on frustrating action by the target; an offer
document to be circulated containing various specified minimum contents; a
document to be circulated by the board of the target setting out comments in the
bid and a recommendation as to acceptance; provisions as to timings (including
82. EEC DIRECIORATF GENERAL. XV Doc. No. 63-87 (First Revision).
83. ANN. RIp. OF THE PANr, (Mar. 31. 1988).
VOL. 23. NO. 2
ACQUISITIONS OF COMPANIES IN EUROPE 399
where there are competing bids); and reporting of holdings and acquisitions of
shares in the target. These requirements are to be welcomed to the extent that
they will raise the general standards of conduct imposed throughout the EEC on
parties to takeover bids, thus ensuring improved investor protection. The
harmonization that the Directive would ensure would reduce the current
disparities between the countries.
The proposals would have the effect of imposing common minimum require-
ments that would be considerably less demanding than those imposed by the City
Code, which would be amended to reflect the Directive but would continue to
impose higher standards. This same effect would be the case, to varying extents,
in some other EEC countries. The result would still be disparities between the
EEC countries in their regulation of takeover activity, although all countries
would be required to impose common minimum requirements.
V. The 1992 Program
The 1992 program derives essentially from the Single European Act, 84 which
added a new article"S to the Treaty of Rome of 1957. The new article requires
the Community to adopt measures with the aim of establishing the internal
market over a period expiring on December 31. 1992. The internal market is
defined in the same article as "an area without internal frontiers in which the free
movement of goods, persons, services, and capital is ensured in accordance with
the provisions of this Treaty.
' 86
It should be appreciated that nothing is new about these aims, which were all
set out in articles 2 and 3 and later chapters of the original treaty. In effect, the
1992 program is a crash program to complete the structure devised. Much of the
publicity surrounding the 1992 program is successful hype. What is significant is
the increased pace of implementation of the necessary changes. Every company
that does business in the EEC needs to consider its implications. Currently, a
flurry of mergers and acquisitions is taking place in the EEC as companies
attempt to position themselves for the single market. Only time will tell which
companies are buying wisely with defined aims and which are reacting without
a clear strategy to a program the long-term effects of which are still largely
unknown.
The European Commission has to date made some 286 proposals for the single
market. Those of most direct significance to merger and acquisition activity will
be: the lifting of restrictions on capital movements within Member States. subject
to certain emergency safeguards 8 7 the harmonization of the structure and
84. EuroIlT.AN COMMUNIHriS (No. 12). Command 9758 (1986) (English version). O.J. Elr. CONINM.
(No. L 169) I (1987).
85. Trealy of Rome of 1957. art. 8(A). 298 U.N.T.S. I I.
86. h/.
87. 31 0.. lR. (C.'Mm. (No. L 178) 5 (1988).
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management of public companies, including directors' duties, shareholders'
rights, and worker participation; 88 a proposed new Directive that would regulate
cross-border mergers; 89 the proposed new Directive for regulation of takeover
bid procedures; 90 and a Directive likely to be approved soon that will require
information to be published when major shareholdings in listed companies are
acquired or disposed of. The relevant Rules will be triggered upon acquisition of
10 percent, 20 percent, 33.33 percent, 50 percent or 66.66 percent of voting
stock of such a company. 9 1
In addition, the proposed merger control regulation 92 would give the Com-
mission power to block inter-Community company mergers. This is not strictly
part of the 1992 program but is closely related.
VI. Conclusion
This article is intended to highlight the current disparity between major EEC
countries as to the practicability of making acquisitions of public companies, the
scope for interference with or control of such acquisitions by relevant authorities,
and the extent of regulation of takeover activity. In some countries hostile
takeover bids are very difficult, if not impossible, to make. In others, they can
be made, but the extent of practical and procedural difficulties should be assessed
before a bid is attempted. In all cases, great care in planning and execution will
be essential. The larger a transaction is, and the more countries it straddles, the
wider the range of possible obstacles becomes.
Considerable progress has already been made within the EEC to harmonize
legislation relating to the listing of securities on Stock Exchanges, accounting
issues, and the establishment of businesses. When the various reforms discussed
above are adopted and implemented, the current imbalances between the
different countries should be substantially alleviated. The importance of the EEC
in this field is increasing significantly, and EEC-originated laws can be expected
to supplant over the years many of the existing national controls and require-
ments. Nevertheless, it would be a foolish corporate predator who underesti-
mates the extent to which language and cultural diversity, let alone the wide
historic differences in investment patterns, will continue to throw up roadblocks
to his activities.
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89. 10th Company Law Directive. 26 O.J. EUR. CoIM. (No. C 23) 11 (1985).
90. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
91. COM (85) 791 and COM (87) 422.
92. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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